Investing to Cooperate: Theory and Experiment by Benoît, Jean-Pierre et al.
Investing to cooperate:
theory and experiment∗.†
Jean-Pierre Benoˆıt‡, Roberto Galbiati§and Emeric Henry¶
Abstract
We study theoretically and in a lab-experiment how legal protection affects the level
and type of investments in a setting where a player chooses an investment level before
interacting repeatedly with the same set of agents. The investment stochastically
affects the payoffs of the game in every subsequent period. We show that without
legal protection: investments will be made since repeated interactions can serve as
a substitute for legal enforcement; investments with less volatile returns are more
likely; the investor might be forced to invest more to keep other players cooperative.
Experimental results are broadly consistent with the theoretical findings.
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1 Introduction
A firm must decide how much to invest in innovation in an environment where intellectual
property rights are weak; a user of a public good needs to choose how much to spend on
improving its quality in a setting where overuse of the public good is a serious concern; an
entrepreneur needs to determine how much to invest in a foreign country where there is a real
risk of expropriation. In these types of situations, how does the absence of legal protection
affect the level and the type of investments made?
It is well understood that repeated interactions can serve as a substitute for legal en-
forcement. For instance, Greif (1989 and 1993) finds that social norms in medieval times
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were able to sustain long-distance trade in the absence of contract enforcement by courts.
In this paper, we examine how informal enforcement, through repeated interactions, affects
the initial investment decision. First, we find that high investment can take place without
formal protection. Second, we find that, when legal protection is absent, investments leading
to returns with low volatility, controlling for mean return, are more likely to be observed.
Third, we show that the absence of protection may sometimes foster greater investment and
we characterize conditions, based on the shape of returns or characteristics of the game, that
can lead to such high levels of investment.
We conduct a laboratory experiment and, to some extent, the theoretical framework is
built to structure and guide the interpretation of the experiment. Our experimental results
are broadly consistent with our theoretical findings. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first experiment designed to compare the levels and types of investment with and without
legal protection, and this can become a promising avenue of research for providing evidence
on an issue extremely difficult to test with field data.1 The experiment also contributes to
the growing literature on infinitely repeated games in the lab. Finally, it also has value in
shedding light on equilibrium selection in a setting characterized by multiple equilibria.
The basic structure of our theoretical model is as follows. An agent, Player 1, makes an
initial investment which determines the i.i.d. stochastic distribution of payoffs in subsequent
periods. There are two alternative regimes. In one, the investment benefits from legal
protections that ensure that the agent captures the rents from his investment. In the other,
the agent’s investment is not protected. Instead, there are N other players who might grab
a share of the payoffs in any period. We model the interaction of the N + 1 players as an
infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma.
We know theoretically that repeated interactions can serve as a substitute for outside
enforcement. If players are arbitrarily patient, it is easy to sustain investment even without
legal protection. With players who are only moderately patient, investment is more difficult.
We characterize the type of investments most likely to be part of an equilibrium in the
absence of protection and compare the investment levels with and without protection.
In the absence of legal protection, investment may require that players be able to coop-
erate, so that Player 1 can recoup his initial outlay. This “cooperation condition” is more
easily satisfied when returns from investment are less volatile (formally linked to a second
order stochastic dominance result). To see this, consider two distributions with identical
mean but where the first is more volatile and payoffs can take larger values. In a period
1A similar argument in favour of experiments in economics is given in Falk and Heckman (2009), where
the authors focus in particular on the application to employment relations. Meloso at al. (2009) also conduct
an experiment capturing innovative behavior where they compare different reward mechanisms.
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where a large payoff is obtained, the temptation to deviate and grab a greater share of the
payoff is acute, while the promise of the future remains fixed. It thus becomes less likely that
the players are able to cooperate along paths that sometimes have very large period payoffs.
This observation implies that, holding expected returns fixed, we should see relatively more
low variance investments when legal protections are weak.
The need for firms to be able to cooperate also has implications for the level of investment.
There are circumstances under which an agent will invest more if the investment is not legally
protected. The reason is that higher initial investments shift up the distribution of future
returns, thereby facilitating cooperation as the future returns to cooperation increase.
The experimental framework echoes the theoretical setup. Participants are randomly
matched in pairs and one member of each pair initially has to make an investment. This
initial investment determines, in each period of the indefinitely repeated game that follows,
the probability of getting a prize of fixed value. In treatments with legal protection the
investor obtains the full prize. In treatments without protection the two participants play
a prisoner’s dilemma. Overall we find, as represented in Figure 1, that the average level of
investment in the no-protection regime is slightly higher than in the protection regime.
We also run two types of treatments where we vary the investment options, keeping the
expected return fixed. For a given investment, in one treatment there is a high probability
of having a low positive return and in the second a low probability of obtaining a high
positive return (with the same mean). We find, in coherence with the logic sketched above,
that cooperation is observed less often in the second treatment. Furthermore, in the second
treatment, both the zero investment outcome and strictly higher levels of investments become
more likely, suggesting that some participants revert to the degenerate equilibrium – no
investment/ no cooperation – while others choose to invest more to foster cooperation.
Our theoretical and experimental results can speak to the renewed debate on the use
of patents to encourage investments in innovation (Boldrin and Levine 2008, Bessen and
Hunt 2007).2 Our results show that legal protection is not necessary for positive levels of
investment, and that the absence of patents may even lead to more innovation. There is
some empirical evidence consistent with this idea. We describe in the conclusion the case of
Red Hat, a very successful company selling an open source operating system and investing
heavily in research. As acknowledged in Red Hat’s annual report: “anyone can copy, modify
2Boldrin and Levine (2008) and Bessen and Hunt (2007) suggest that the software industry was more
innovative before the introduction of patents. Our theory suggest one channel. There are a number of papers
explaining how innovation may occur in the absence of any kind of formal protection (Scherer and Ross 1990,
Benoˆıt 1985, Henry and Ponce 2011, Henry and Ruiz-Aliseda 2012, Boldrin and Levine 2002 and 2005, see
also Anton and Yao 1994 and 2002). These papers show, in different environments, that innovation can
occur in the absence of formal protection. However, in all these contributions, less innovation is conducted
than if the innovator was granted a monopoly.
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and redistribute Red Hat Enterprise Linux”. Numerous clones do indeed exist, but they
appear to avoid competing aggressively and do not gain much market share. We argue this
behavior is coherent with our theory and that Red Hat could potentially be more innovative
than if it had full property rights on its innovations.
The idea that repeated interactions can serve as a substitute for legal enforcement is al-
ready well developed. Greif (1989, 1993) provides historical evidence. It is also the starting
point of the relational contracting literature (Klein and Leﬄer 1981, Levin 2003) that looks
more in detail at the contractual terms when interactions are repeated and contracts incom-
plete. However, in these papers, investment is absent. One exception is Halac (2013), who
examines a similar setup to ours, with an investment decision before a repeated game. She
also finds that investment might be higher than in a fully contractible benchmark. Whereas
our player invests more in order to facilitate cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma, in Halac
the player invests more in order to increase her payoff from a bargaining game. The focus of
Halac’s paper is quite different than ours and this is reflected in the setup of her model. Ha-
lac is interested in studying the contractual terms, not systematically comparing investment
levels across protection levels nor the type of investments observed in the different regimes.3
In addition, since an important contribution of our paper is the experimental evidence, our
theoretical model is partly targeted towards formulating lab-testable implications.
Ramey and Watson (1997) also examine a setting where a prior investment affects the
shape of a prisoner’s dilemma (in their setting, the investment affects only the payoff when
both cooperate). They share the idea that higher up-front investment favors cooperation.
They do not however focus on the comparison of investment levels between regimes nor do
they study the types of investment we can expect across regimes. They focus more specifically
on how this initial decision endogenously affects job destructions over the business cycle. In
a very different setup, Levine and Modica (2013) also examine a prior investment stage
before a repeated interaction. The game is a public goods game and they focus on how peer
discipline can encourage initial investment
Importantly, our study contributes to the recent experimental literature on cooperation
and collusion in infinitely repeated games (Roth and Murnigham 1978; Dal Bo 2005; Dreber
et al. 2008; Camera and Casari 2009; Aoyagi and Frechette 2009; Dal Bo and Frechette
2011; Bigoni, Potters and Spagnolo 2012). As several of these papers, our findings highlight
the fact that players are sensitive to the future expected profits when taking their current
decisions.4 However, while this literature has mainly focused on understanding both the
3Furthermore, the returns in her model (provided agents trade) are identical across periods and she
therefore cannot obtain results in the spirit of our second order stochastic dominance argument.
4Indeed we will find that cooperation is higher when the investor invested more initially.
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dynamics of cooperation and the conditions favouring collusion or cooperation in infinitely
repeated games, our focus is to compare investment choices under different institutional
regimes. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to examine experimentally this type
of game where a date zero decision influences the type of game played repeatedly afterwards.
Furthermore, this paper is also one of the few that offers an experimental comparison of
environments with and without protection.
Our paper, is also related to the literature on collusion in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986),
who study collusion in a stochastic environment over the business cycle. We add investments
in this framework. One interpretation of our model is that it endogenises the shape of
the business cycle. We also model the stochastic return differently, which allows us to
characterize the condition on second order stochastic dominance. In a similar vein, Dal Bo
(2007) studies collusion when the interest rate fluctuates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model.
In Section 3, we characterize the equilibria and derive our main theoretical results. In Section
4, we present the experimental setup and results. All proofs, tables and figures are presented
in the appendix.
2 Model
In this section, we present a formal model that is general enough to encompass many scenarios
of interest. In the next section, we supply several applications.
In period 0, Player 1 makes an initial investment k. The size of this initial investment
stochastically affects the payoffs in subsequent period. Specifically, given a period 0 in-
vestment k, F (pi, k) is the i.i.d. cumulative probability distribution of the payoff relevant
variable pi ≥ 0 in each subsequent period. We assume that F (0, 0) = 1, so that investment
is necessary for a positive return, and, for k′ > k, F (pi, k′) (weakly) first order stochastically
dominates F (pi, k).
In the game with legal protection, in period t ≥ 1 player 1 mechanically collects the
payoff realization pit while the other players earn 0. Player 1 chooses an investment level that
maximizes his total expected discounted profits. That is, Player 1 chooses k (in period 0) to
maximize −k+∑∞t=1 δt ∫∞0 pidF (pi, k) = −k+ δ1−δE (pi|k), where E (pi|k) = ∫∞0 pidF (pi, k) <
∞. We suppose the maximization problem has a solution k∗ > 0.
Without legal protection, following Player 1’s initial investment the N +1 players engage
in an infinite horizon game, as follows. In each period t ≥ 1, the players play a prisoner’s
dilemma whose “scale” depends on the realization pit. As we will see, it is more difficult
for firms to cooperate in a period where the payoff realization is large. Hence, it may be in
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Player 1’s interest to restrict the size of the payoff and we give him the option of doing so
by choosing, at no cost, a maximum value pi that the variable pi can take. We allow that pi
can be chosen to be ∞, so that no constraint is imposed.
More precisely, the players engage in the following game:
• In period t = 0, Player 1 chooses k ≥ 0 and p¯i ∈ (R+,∞).
• In each period t ≥ 1,
1. A draw pit of the payoff relevant variable is taken from F (pi, k).
2. Every player chooses between two actions C (“cooperate”) and D (“deviate”) as
a function of (ht, pit), where ht denotes the history of play up to date t.
• With two players, i.e., N + 1 = 2, payoffs are described by the following matrix, where
pˆit = min (pit, pi):
C D
C (α1pˆit, αopˆit) (γ1pˆit, βopˆit)
D (β1pˆit, γopˆit) (λ1pˆit, λopˆit)
We assume βi > αi, λi ≥ γi, λi < αi, and 1 > βi. These conditions mean that the
game played in each period is a prisoner’s dilemma, albeit one with, potentially, weakly
dominant strategies rather than strictly dominant ones. This potential difference is not
important and is only relevant for the experiment we run. The condition β1 < 1 ensures
that Player 1 always does worse in the absence of legal protections.
• The game with N + 1 players generalizes the matrix. If everyone plays C, the payoff of
player 1 is given by α1pˆit and the payoff of players {2, ..., N+1} is given by αopˆit. If player
1 plays D and all the others play C, player 1 obtains β1pˆit and players {2, ..., N + 1}
obtain γopˆit. If a single player other than 1 deviates, player 1 gets γ1pˆit, the deviator gets
βopˆit and all the others get γopˆit. Finally, if at least two players play D, player 1 obtains
λ1pˆit and the other players obtain λopˆit.
5 Again, 1 > βi > αi > λi ≥ γi. Throughout,
we consider games where the payoff of players {2, ..., N + 1} are symmetric, though
our results can be extended to allow for asymmetries.
The dynamic game will typically have many equilibria. For ease of exposition, we restrict
ourselves to symmetric subgame perfect equilibria. In such equilibria, along the equilibrium
5These payoffs are chosen to keep the notation to a minimum. In most applications of the model, it
makes more sense for a player’s payoff from choosing D to strictly decrease as the number of other players
choosing D increases. We could make that assumption instead without changing our results.
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path of play, either every player chooses C or every player chooses D. Our analysis can be
extended to allow for asymmetric equilibria. In Section 3.2, we discuss an example in which
we consider all equilibria, without affecting the results. We note also that the restriction
to symmetric strategies is less severe than it may at first appear as the stage game itself
may be asymmetric. Thus, when the players cooperate this could be with a split that
purposely favours Player 1 – that is, α1 > α0 – in order to compensate Player 1 for his initial
investment.6
For player i, αi−λi provides a measure of the gains from cooperating, while βi−αi mea-
sures the instantaneous benefits from deviating. It turns out that an essential characteristic
of the game is the following parameter, which we call the “cooperation ratio” of the game:
R ≡ mini
[
αi − λi
βi − αi
]
The cooperation ratio will be shown to be useful in structuring comparisons between in-
vestment levels with and without protection. Below, we study some applications of the
model.
2.1 Application 1: investment in innovation
A growing share of innovation is conducted without the protection of patents. Consider
the case of the firm Red Hat, which we discuss in more detail in the conclusion. Most
of its revenues come from the sale of a pre-compiled version of the open source operating
system Linux, called Red Hat Enterprise Linux. Anyone can copy and resell this software
and numerous clones do indeed exist. However, these clones tend not to be very aggressive.
Furthermore, even in this environment with no protection, Red Hat invests a lot in innova-
tion: it is the biggest contributor to the Linux Kernel and pays the salaries of most of its
researchers.
The model can be used to represent the interaction between an innovator and a set of
imitators, such as Red Hat and its clones. With this interpretation, the initial investment
k is an investment in innovative capability, such as a research facility. This investment
determines the probability distribution of future innovations.7 In each period, the firm
6In a more general model, the shares of the players could be made endogenous. We have analyzed such
a model for the special application of innovation. There, the players play a pricing game in which they
may generate an uneven split by choosing different capacities. (Giving Player 1 a greater share eases his
investment constraint but makes cooperation more difficult in the subgame.) With appropriate modifications,
the results of this paper go through.
7In a more general model, this stock investment would be complemented by on-going research expendi-
tures. We considered such a model in an earlier version, but this complication does not change our main
results.
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randomly develops an innovation which can instantly be brought to market. The market
value of an innovation degrades over time; for simplicity, the life span of a new product is
exactly one period. The realization pit ≥ 0 is then monopoly profits in period t. In each
period, the firms play a prisoner’s dilemma in which defecting corresponds to charging a low
price, while cooperating corresponds to charging the monopoly price, with one caveat: if the
payoff realization is exceptionally high, the firms may choose to cooperate on a lower price
yielding p¯i instead of pi. This possibility is modeled by firm 1’s choosing p¯i in period 0.
With this interpretation, an innovator with a patent simply captures monopoly profits.
Without a patent, suppose that marginal cost is constant and, say, the firms split the market
symmetrically when they cooperate. We then have αi =
1
N+1
, 1
N+1
< βi < 1, γi = 0,and
0 ≤ λi < 1N+1 .8 By setting λi = 0, we can think of (D,D) as a reduced form way of modeling
a price war down to marginal cost.
2.2 Free-rider problem with weak property rights
In her Nobel lecture (2010), Ostrom describes her work on the different institutional ar-
rangements governing common pool resources. Referring to large scale studies of irrigation,
she notes that “farmer-managed systems are likely to grow more rice, distribute water more
equitably and keep their systems in better repair than government systems.” In the case of
forests, she describes activities undertaken by some members of the community to preserve
the quality of the public good.
Our model can be used to describe the interaction between users of a public good (such
as the wood from a forest in Ostrom’s example). In period 0, Player 1 has the capacity to
make an initial investment that will increase the quality of the public good. In each period
t, a draw of pit is taken, where pit is total size of the public good. The stochastic aspect in
the case of the forest is due, say, to fluctuating weather conditions.
With legal property rights, Player 1 controls access to the good. Without property rights,
following a realization pit the players decide on their levels of consumption of the public good.
Action C corresponds to consuming a low amount and D a high amount. Consumption at
the low level provides a personal benefit, while exerting minimal externalities on the other
parties. Consumption at a high level imposes significant costs, so that all players consuming
at a high level is unsustainable for that period. As written, this model does not take into
account the dynamics of overuse of the public good in the sense that there is no linkage
between the consumption today and the level of pi tomorrow. The externality is captured
8Thus, if N = 4, when two firms play D each one earns ζ5 , which is the same payoff they would earn if
all the firms played D. As indicated in footnote 4, this is for notational ease. We could instead have that
when m firms play D each one earns ζm without affecting our results.
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here only within the period, but the model could be generalized to capture the dynamic
externality.
2.3 Application 3: investing in countries with weak property rights
Institutions play a key role in the amount of foreign direct investment flowing into coun-
tries (Benassy-Quere et al 2007; Wheeler and Mody 1992; Daude and Stein 2007). The
enforcement of legal rules also impacts the type of sectors attracting investments, although
evidence is a bit scarce. Our model can capture the decision of a firm investing in a country
where it faces a risk of expropriation. The size of the initial investment affects the stochastic
production that the investment can generate. In each period that follows, the government
decides whether or not to expropriate the firm.
Specifically, we think of expropriation as imposing a very high tax rate. The firm decides
whether to evade taxes and the government simultaneously decides on the tax rate. In the
case of a reliable legal system, the tax authority cannot arbitrarily impose an exorbitant high
tax rate and the firm cannot evade. In the absence of a reliable legal system, the two players
play a prisoner’s dilemma. For the firm, C corresponds to not evading and paying the full
amount of taxes while D corresponds to evading a fixed portion 1− e of the production at a
cost c(1− e)pi (cost of dissimulating some income). For the tax authority C corresponds to
picking a low tax rate τ and D a high one τ (i.e., expropriate the firm). The game is then
the following:9
C D
C ((1− τ)pi , τpi) ((1− τ)pi , τpi)
D ((1− τ)epi + (1− c)(1− e)pi , τepi) ((1− τ)epi + (1− c)(1− e)pi , τepi)
We return to this example at the end of section 3.2 when interpreting the results.
3 Investments with and without protection
3.1 Equilibria
In the absence of legal protection, there always exists a degenerate equilibrium in which
everyone plays D in periods t = 1, 2..., regardless of the value of pi, and Player 1 invests,
accordingly, kd = arg maxk
{−k + δ
1−δλ1
∫∞
0
pidF (pi, k)
}
. If returns are small when players
9To satisfy the constraints imposed on the coefficients, we need the following conditions (1 − τ)pi <
(1 − τ)epi + (1 − c)(1 − e)pi, τpi < τpi, (1 − τ)pi > (1 − τ)epi + (1 − c)(1 − e)pi and τpi > τepi. Sufficient
conditions are τ > c and τe− τ + c(1− e) > 0.
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do not cooperate (i.e., λ1 small), then kd will be small and may well be zero. This is the
outcome most people have in mind when thinking of environments without legal rules.
There can also exist non-degenerate equilibria where Player 1 invests a significant amount.
Indeed, it is already well understood that repeated interactions can serve as a substitute for
legal enforcement. For any investment k, if players are arbitrarily patient they will be able
to cooperate in the subgame following period 0. Moreover, the discounted sum of payoffs
from repeated cooperation will more than compensate an arbitrarily patient Player 1 for his
investment.
However, while significant investment may be easy with arbitrarily patient players, it is
trickier with moderately patient players who value short term gains. Proposition 1 describes
the conditions for an investment of k 6= kd by Player 1 to form part of an equilibrium. These
conditions are that i) the players manage to play cooperatively – hence, they prefer playing
C in every period to deviating for one period and subsequently obtaining the non-cooperative
payoff forever (which is captured by condition (2) below) and ii) Player 1 prefers investing
k to playing the degenerate equilibrium (condition 3).
Proposition 1 A choice of k by Player 1 forms part of a symmetric subgame perfect equi-
librium if and only if either, a)
k = kd (1)
or b) there exists a pi such that:
pi ≤ δ
1− δR
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
(2)
and
−k + δ
1− δα1
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
≥ −kd + δ
1− δλ1
∫ ∞
0
pidF (pi, kd) (3)
Consider a path where Player 1 has limited the maximum payoff realization to pi by
choosing p¯i = pi in period 0. Condition (2) guarantees that the players cooperate for all
payoff realizations smaller or equal to pi (if there are no incentives to deviate for a realization
pi, then it is also the case for a realization pi ≤ pi). The term ∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi)) is
the expected per period payoff when, for any realization of pi above pi, the payoff is limited
to pi.
To understand the reason that Player 1 may choose to impose an upper bound p¯i, let
pimax = {suppi s.t. (2) holds}. Since the right hand side of (2) is bounded (by δ1−δR∗E (pi|k)),
we have pimax <∞. The quantity pimax provides an upper bound on the realization of pi for
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which players can cooperate when player 1 invests k. Thus, it is in Player 1’s interest to
limit the returns to the investment to be at most pimax and to choose p¯i = pimax in period 0.
If not, for realizations pi > pimax, players would be unable to cooperate, low returns would
be obtained, and the overall expected return would be lowered.
At a more intuitive level, the higher the draw of pi, the larger the temptation to deviate
and play D, since the immediate gains from deviating are increasing in pi while the future
expected draws and potential gains to cooperating are unaffected (draws are i.i.d). Suppose
that pi takes only two values piL and piH and that when pi takes the value piH , players are
unable to cooperate, while it is possible for a value piL. It would then be in the interest of the
players, when the draw of pi is piH , to restrict the value of pi to be piL, to allow for cooperation.
For instance, under the innovation interpretation from Section 2.1, the players engage in a
pricing game following a successful innovation. If the firms are not able to share monopoly
profits when the draw is very high, they might still find a lower price where cooperation is
possible.10
The existence of the upperbound pimax on the cooperative period payoff suggests that
the total surplus may be lower in the world without legal enforcement. This fact, combined
with the fact that Player 1 must share the returns from investment, and the need to sat-
isfy equilibrium constraints, implies that there may be some investment levels that, while
profitable with legal protection, do not form part of an equilibrium without such protection.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, we show that this may lead to higher equilibrium investments
in the absence of legal protections, to relax the investment constraint 2.
The conditions in Proposition 1 highlight the key role of the distribution F . In the next
sections, we explore not only how legal rules affects the level of investment (section 3.3) but
also the effect of the type of investment as described by the distribution of returns F (section
3.2).
3.2 Risk and investments
Different types of investments are more or less conducive to cooperation and thus more or less
likely to be observed absent legal protection. The following proposition shows that a ceteris
paribus increase in riskiness, in the sense of a mean-preserving spread, makes investment
10The equilibria found by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) have a similar feature, and our framework,
interpreted as in application 1, is similar to the one they use in their study of collusion in the face of
uncertain demand. We add the essential element of initial investment and use a simpler and more general
setup. Note also that we use a shock on monopoly profits rather than a shock on demand used in their
framework. This difference is crucial for the comparative statics we perform in Section 3.2.
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more difficult in the absence of legal protections (even with risk-neutral players).11
Proposition 2 Let the distribution G be a mean-preserving spread of F . Suppose that with
returns characterized by the distribution G, there is a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium
in which Player 1 invests k. Then with returns characterized by the distribution F , there
is also a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which Player 1 invests k. Conversely,
suppose that with returns characterized by F there is a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium
in which player 1 invests k 6= kd. There may not be a subgame perfect equilibrium in which
Player 1 invests k when returns are characterized by the distribution G.
Proposition 2 provides a testable prediction of the model, which we explore in our ex-
periment. If we start from a distribution of returns for which a particular investment is
sustainable and take a series of mean-preserving spreads, we might arrive at a situation
where such an investment is no longer possible. As an illustration, suppose that there are
two players who discount at a rate δ = 1
2
and that in each period following Player 1’s initial
investment they play the following prisoner’s dilemma.12
C D
C (3
5
pˆit,
2
5
pˆit) (0pˆit,
3
5
pˆit)
D (4
5
pˆit, 0pˆit) (
1
10
pˆit,
1
10
pˆit)
We contrast two distribution functions. Under F , an investment of k = 15 yields a return
of pit = 100 in each period. Under G, an investment of 15 yields a period return of 300
with probability 1
3
and 0 with probability 2
3
. In both cases, smaller investments yield 0 in
every period and larger investments are of no benefit. With legal protections, these two
technologies, which have the same mean, are equivalent for a risk-neutral agent, who will
invest 15. Without protection, however, they are quite different.
First consider F . An investment of 15 followed by (C,C) in every period forms part of a
stationary equilibrium. In any subgame, following the path yields Player 1 a total discounted
payoff of 1
1−δ60 = 120, while deviating yields 80 +
δ
1−δ10 = 90. Player 2 also has no incentive
to deviate. Moreover, Player 1’s payoff from investing is −15 + δ
1−δ60 = 45 > 0.
Now consider the distribution G. Suppose the players try to play (C,C) repeatedly and
consider a period in which a payoff of 300 has been realized. For Player 1, following the path
11Similar reasoning shows that mean-preserving spreads makes collusion more difficult in the framework
of Rotemberg and Saloner, although the way they model uncertainty does not allow them to reach this
conclusion.
12Following the application in Section 2.1, we can interpret the game as one in which Player 1 is an
innovative firm and Player 2 has the ability to copy the innovation costlessly. In order to compensate Player
1 for investing, when the players cooperate, Firm 2 restricts its output to give Firm 1 a larger share. To
match this interpretation, the game is chosen to be asymmetric. This asymmetry plays no role, however.
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yields 3
5
(300)+ δ
1−δ
3
5
Epi = 240, while deviating yields 4
5
(300)+ δ
1−δ
1
10
Epi = 250. Cooperation
is no longer sustainable. The reason is that while the expected continuation payoff from
cooperating under G is the same as under F , the instantaneous gain from deviating rises
when a realization of 300 rather than 100 occurs.13 As a result, a positive investment is not
possible under G.
This no-investment conclusion does not depend upon the fact that we have restricted
ourselves to symmetric equilibria. If we drop this restriction, then new equilibria appear
under F . For instance, an investment of 15 followed by (D,C) in period 1 and (C,C) in all
subsequent periods forms part of an equilibrium. However, no new equilibria appear under
G. That is, Player 1 does not invest even if we allow for asymmetric play. More generally,
allowing for asymmetric equilibria would not affect the result of Proposition 2.14
This result has implications for the types of investments that should be observed in
developing countries (application 3, described in section 2). In countries with weak property
rights, investors worry about the risk of expropriation. Investments lead to random returns
year to year and, as shown by Duncan (2006) in an empirical study of the mining industry,
expropriations are much more likely in periods of price booms. Thus, an investor would be
more likely to initially choose an investment leading to less volatile returns. In line with
this idea, Dorsey et al. (2008) and Mikesell (1971) suggest that the share of FDI in minerals
relative to petroleum is higher in countries with strong property rights (oil prices being
less volatile than most minerals). This is of course only suggestive evidence and a more
systematic empirical test of Proposition 2 would be in order. This is precisely the purpose
of our experiment, which tests this result by comparing two types of treatments where the
distribution of returns can be ranked according to second order stochastic dominance.
3.3 Comparing the level of investment across legal regimes
The strength of the legal regime affects not only the type of investment but also the level.
We would like to compare the level of investment in environments where legal protection is
available to the level in environments where it is not. However, this is often an ambiguous
comparison, with some non-degenerate equilibria in the no-protection game involving more
investment and some less. Rather than making a selection among equilibria, we examine a
special case where unambiguous statements can be made. We find conditions under which
all non-degenerate equilibria without legal protections involve more investment than with
13Here, limiting the maximum payoff by choosing p¯i < 300 does not help since this also proportionally
reduces the continuation payoff.
14In any period with a realization pit, the shape of the equilibrium affects the share of pit each player
obtains, but does not change the fact that it is a multiple of pit. Thus, the proof of Proposition 2 would
carry through.
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legal protections and conditions under which they all involve less. This special case yields
testable predictions that we explore in our experiment.
When an investment which is feasible with legal protections is not sustainable without,
there are two possible reasons. One is that, in order for Player 1 to recoup the investment,
the players must cooperate but they do not manage to do so. The other is that, although the
players could manage to cooperate, Player 1 does not earn enough to justify his investment.
As we will see, in the first instance Player 1 responds by choosing a larger investment in
order to facilitate cooperation, while in the second instance Player 1 responds by choosing a
smaller investment so that less money needs to be recouped.
We now suppose that the stochastic investment process is such that, in any period, there
is either a “failure” worth 0 or a “success” worth p˜im. That is, the payoff variable pi can only
take one of two values, 0 or p˜im. The initial investment k determines the likelihood p(k) of
obtaining p˜im in any single period.
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We parameterize the likelihood function p in two ways. First, we decompose Player 1’s
investment into a fixed component H (which could be zero) that he must pay in order to
have any productive capacity at all and a variable component. If player 1 pays the fixed cost
H and an incremental amount k, then the probability of the realization p˜im in any period is
p (k) = mh (k), where h : R+ → [0, 1), h (0) = 0, h′ > 0, h′′ < 0, and m ∈ (0, 1]. If H > 0
and Player 1 does not incur the fixed cost H, then p (k) = 0 for all k. Higher H’s increase
the minimum required investment, but have no effect on the marginal impact of additional
investments above this requirement.
Second, we use the variable m to parameterize the riskiness of the technology by writing
a successful payoff as p˜im =
pi0
m
(m also parameterizes the probability p (k) = mh (k)). Thus,
if Player 1 incurs the fixed cost H and makes an additional investment k, then, in any
single period, with probability p (k) the payoff variable pi = p˜im =
pi0
m
and with probability
(1− p (k)) the payoff variable pi = 0. Decreases in m induce a mean-preserving spread on the
innovation process and have no effect on the expected per period revenue p(k)p˜im = h(k)pi0.
With legal protections, the optimal incremental level of investment above H is inde-
pendent of H, whenever this optimal level is greater than zero, and is independent of m.
Formally, let k∗ = arg max
{−k −H + δ
1−δp (k) p˜im
}
= arg max
{−k + δ
1−δh (k) pi0
}
and de-
fine H ′ = −k∗ + δ
1−δh (k
∗)pi0. Then, with legal protections k∗ is the optimal investment for
all (m,H) ∈ (0, 1]× [0, H ′). For (m,H) ∈ (0, 1]× (H ′,∞), the optimal investment is 0.
15Consider, for instance, the application of the model to innovation. For certain types of products, the
nature of a successful innovation is not very variable and the investment level mainly influences the frequency
of innovations. Examples include the case of upgrades of software or smartphones, where the issue is mostly
one of frequency rather than quality. It may also be the case of the fashion industry (Raustiala and Sprigman,
2006), where a crucial factor is the speed of introduction of new collections.
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As noted, decreases in m induce a mean-preserving spread on the returns and have no
effect on the equilibrium investment k∗ in the game with protection. However, in the no-
protection game the incremental investment k∗ gets harder to sustain as m falls (Proposition
2). An investment of k∗ that is sustainable for m = 1 may not be sustainable for smaller
values of m. The following proposition shows that, for some parameters, all non-degenerate
equilibria involve a greater investment than k∗.
Proposition 3 and 4 focus on situations where the reason for equilibrium breakdown is
the failure to cooperate. It is useful to introduce the terminology strict equilibrium: an
equilibrium in which all players strictly prefer following the path to deviating.
Proposition 3 Fix H and suppose that for m = 1 there is a strict symmetric subgame
perfect equilibrium in which Player 1 makes the incremental investment k∗ 6= kd. There
exists values m and m (m < m < 1) such that:
• If m ∈ [m, 1], there exist subgame perfect equilibria where Player 1 invests more than,
less than, or the same as k∗.
• If m ∈ [m,m], any non-degenerate equilibrium involves higher investments than with
protection: k > k∗.
• If m ∈ [0,m] the only equilibrium is the degenerate equilibrium.
Moreover there are non-empty intervals on which such equilibria exist.
While future expected profits are unaffected by decreases in m, the instantaneous tempta-
tion to play non-cooperatively in a successful period increases, since the gain from a deviation
is (βi − αi) pi0m . To counter this temptation, Player 1 increases his initial investment to in-
crease future gains from cooperation. It is crucial that this increased investment raises the
probability of obtaining a high payoff, not (just) the value of this high payoff. As a re-
sult, the expected future returns to cooperation increase without affecting the instantaneous
gains from deviating. Suppose that, on the contrary, investment raised the successful payoff
without affecting its likelihood. That is, suppose we had p¯i = pi(k)
m
, with pi′ (k) > 0, and
p = mh for some mh ≤ 1. Then, increased investment would raise both the future returns
to cooperation and the instantaneous gains from deviating in offsetting fashion, and would
not facilitate cooperation (or make it more difficult).
A different way of comparing investment levels across regimes is to use the cooperation
ratio R. When R ≈ 0, cooperation is impossible because the gains to cooperation are small
relative to the one-period gain from deviating. Conversely, when R ≈ ∞, cooperation is
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simple. More generally, as R decreases cooperation becomes more difficult.16 The following
Proposition shows that, again, this may force Player 1 to invest more than k∗.
Proposition 4 Fix H and m and suppose there is a strict symmetric subgame perfect equi-
librium in which Player 1 makes the incremental investment k∗ 6= kd. There exists values R
and R such that in the no-protection regime:
• If R ∈ [R,+∞], there may exist subgame perfect equilibria where Player 1 invests more
than, less than, or the same as k∗.
• If R ∈ [R,R], any non-degenerate equilibrium involves higher investments than with
protection: k > k∗.
• If R ∈ [0, R] the only equilibrium is the degenerate equilibrium.
Moreover there are non-empty intervals on which such equilibria exist.
Propositions 3 and 4 present reactions to cooperation failures. As cooperation becomes
more difficult to sustain, Player 1 responds by investing more, rendering cooperation easier.
The following proposition involves a comparative static where cooperation is always possible
but the issue is the investment condition. Now Player 1 responds by investing less so that
he needs to recoup less money.
Proposition 5 Let H = 0 and m = 1 and suppose there is a strict symmetric subgame per-
fect equilibrium in which Player 1 makes the incremental investment k∗ 6= kd. There exists
an Hˆ such that i) for all 0 ≤ H ≤ Hˆ, an incremental investment k∗ remains part of an
equilibrium and ii) for H > Hˆ every non-degenerate equilibrium involves an incremental in-
vestment k < k∗. Moreover there is a non-empty interval on which non-degenerate equilibria
exist.
4 Experimental Analysis
In this section, we present the design and results of a laboratory experiment tailored to
achieve two goals. First, to test specifically some of the results of the theoretical analysis, in
particular the effect of increased riskiness described in Proposition 2 and the possibility of
higher levels of investment described in Proposition 3. Second, since a degenerate equilibrium
always exists, the experiment can also shed light on equilibrium selection issues and provide
some empirical evidence on investment levels with and without legal protection.
16Note that varying R amounts to varying the shares αi, βi, γi, λi.
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4.1 Experimental setup
The experimental study is based on four different treatments. Two treatments correspond to
an environment with legal protection of the stochastic outcome of investments (we refer to
those as legal protection, LP, treatments) and two to an environment with no legal protection
(we refer to those as no legal protection, NP, treatments). Within each regime (LP vs NP),
we implement two different scenarios, corresponding to two different investment options
described in Table 1. In one option, there are relatively high probabilities of obtaining a low
prize; in the other option, the prize is doubled and the probabilities are halved. We refer to
the four treatments as LP-low-prize, LP-high-prize, NP-low-prize and NP-high prize.
We reproduce infinitely repeated games in the lab using a standard procedure involving
a random continuation rule (see Dal Bo and Frechette 2011, Dal Bo 2005 and Casari and
Camera 2009 for recent examples). At the end of each round, the computer randomly
determines whether or not another round will be played in the game. The probability of
continuation is fixed at 0.85 for all treatments and is independent of any choices players
make during the game. The players thus play a series of games of random length.
In the two LP treatments, all games are single-player games (there is no interaction with
other players). In the first round of each game, the player first obtains an initial endowment
of 11 tokens and makes an investment decision, choosing one among four possible investment
levels: 0, 1, 6 or 11 tokens. This initial investment determines the probability of obtaining
a prize in each round of the game but has no influence on the other games. The exact
probabilities and the level of the prize depend on the treatment as described in Table 1.
In the NP treatments, each game involves two players : an investor (player 1) and a
second player (Player 2). At the beginning of the game, each player receives 11 tokens and
one of them is randomly selected to be the investor (note that to avoid framing issues, in
the experimental instructions we call the investor Role A and the second player Role B). In
the first round, player 1 makes an investment decision with the same options as in the LP
treatments (player 2 takes no action in the first round). In the subsequent rounds, whenever
the investment is successful and a prize is obtained (the probability of success is determined
by the decision of the investor in the first round), the two players play a prisoner’s dilemma
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game represented in Table 2.17
H L
H 1
2
pi, 1
2
pi 0, pi
L pi, 0 0, 0
Table 2
This set-up fits with our general framework, with αi = 1/2, βi = 1, γi = 0 and λi = 0. At
the end of each round when a prize is obtained, each player observes the other player’s choice
(H or L).
When a game (randomly) ends, a new one starts and is played in the same way. In the NP
treatments, players are randomly re-matched with a different player. This procedure makes
it unlikely that the same pair will play together more than once. In any case, the game is
played anonymously and players cannot identify their partner. For the NP treatments (resp.
LP), fifteen minutes (resp. ten minutes) after the start of the session, no new game starts
but players finish the games they started.18
4.2 Theoretical predictions
While our theoretical analysis focusses on symmetrical equilibria, nothing forces our experi-
mental subjects to do the same. Indeed, the game we have chosen even invites them to play
asymmetrically as, say, alternating plays of (H,L) and (L,H) is myopically self-enforcing, as
opposed to repeated plays of (H,H). On the other hand, playing (H,H) is a simpler way to
cooperate. It is interesting to see the extent to which the predictions of the model, precisely
as written, are borne out by the experiment. Hence, we test the implications of the model
with respect to symmetrical equilibria only.19
Our model allows us to make clear theoretical predictions. First, in both LP treatments,
the optimal choice of a risk-neutral player is an investment level of 1, although the level
of expected profits does not vary vastly across the different positive choices (12.6 for an
investment of 1, 12.1 for 6 and 11.6 for 11).20
17In the LP treatments, whenever the investment is successful, the prize is obtained entirely by the single
player. Nevertheless, to keep the two set of treatments symmetric, players in the LP treatment also have to
choose whether they want to play high (H) or low (L) as in the NP treatment. The choice L gives them
a profit of zero, and the choice they have to make is thus obvious, but it preserves symmetry with the NP
treatments.
18We did not put a time constraint on the games already started but they never lasted more than a few
minutes.
19Recall also that one of the central predictions we test, i.e the result on mean preserving spreads is
preserved under asymmetric equilibria.
20While an investment of 1 is optimal for a risk-neutral money maximizer, subjects may have other
motivations as well. For instance, they might get benefits from varying their choices to break the tediousness
of the task. In addition, there was some possible benefit to playing 0 in order to end the game sooner and
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In the case of the NP-low-prize treatment, an investment of 1 in the first round remains
part of an equilibrium whereas in the NP-high-prize treatment it does not. Examining the
incentives of the players (shown in Table 3), brings out clearly the mechanism developed
in the theory. In both NP treatments, for an investment of 1, in the subgame following
a successful realization of the investment, each player’s continuation payoff is 6.8 if both
of them play H for the rest of the game. However, in the low-prize treatment a player’s
instantaneous gain from deviating to L is only 4, while in the high-prize treatment it is 8,
and cooperation is possible only with a low prize.
In the low-prize game, all investment levels form part of an equilibrium; in the high-prize
game, all investment levels other than 1 form part of an equilibrium. We have the following
clear prediction that can be tested:
• An investment of 1 is less likely in the NP-high-prize treatment than in the NP-low-
prize treatment (special case of Proposition 3)
We can also test the consistency of the behavior in the stage prisoner dilemma game with
the mechanism we propose:21
• Following an investment of 1 by the investor, playing L by player 2 is more likely in
the NP-high-prize treatment than in the NP-low-prize treatment
• The probability of observing H,H increases with the initial investment of the investor
Finally, we can shed light on equilibrium selection issues and show evidence on the
following questions:
• Is the zero investment degenerate equilibrium more common in the absence of protec-
tion (NP treatments)?
• Is there on average more or less investment with or without protection of the outcomes
of the investment and without protection with high or low prize?
proceed to the next game, as each game had a small fixed payment associated with it.
21These are not strictly speaking predictions, but are natural consequences of the model. For instance, in
the NP-high-prize treatment, playing 1 is not an equilibrium, so interpreting what happens off the equilibrium
path is not unambiguous. However, we know that in the subgame following a prize, player B should play L
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4.3 Experimental results
The 10 experimental sessions (3 of each NP treatments and 2 of each LP treatment) were
run between at the Ecole Polytechnique (France) in a dedicated experimental lab. A specific
software was designed to run the experiment to be able to rematch players while others were
finishing their game.22 The participants were a mix of students and staff at the university.
A total of 132 subjects participated in the experiment playing a total of 1756 games. The
average earnings of players was 17.8 euros. At the end of the game, participants were
asked to fill in a survey that allowed us to control for gender and whether the participants
were students. In the survey, we also introduced questions about individuals’ risk attitudes
(Dohmen et al 2011). Thus, in some of our analysis we can also control for subjects self-
reported risk attitudes.23 In all the regression analysis that follow, the standard errors are
clustered at the session level (as in Dal Bo and Frechette 2011 for instance), to control for
possible session effects that would introduce correlation in errors.24
4.3.1 Investment with legal protection vs. investment without protection
Comparing the level of investment in an environment such as the one described in our
theoretical analysis with and without legal protection based on real world data is hard for
the simple reason that counter-factuals are hard to come by. Experiments creating artificial
counter-factuals are thus a valuable source of evidence to shed light on this comparison.
As we can see in Figure 1, potential investors choose on average very similar amounts of
investment in the LP and in the NP treatments. The average investment is in fact slightly
higher in the absence of protection (LP), but this difference is not significant (p-value of
0.149 in a t-test and non significant coefficient in a regression controlling for individual
characteristics).
These results do not support the oft-made claim that legal protection is unavoidable to
encourage investment. This idea is often based on the presumption that, in the absence
of legal protection, players would revert to the degenerate equilibrium where followers act
aggressively and the leaders (investors) thus refrain from investing positive amounts. Table 4
22The software was designed under a standard server/client architecture, the server uses’ socket protocol
to communicate with the clients. The server was implemented using the Adobe Flex technology and the
clients deployed under Adobe Air. The backend of the server rely on relational database server (MySQL)
for storing. Each “game” was considered as a thread, this method allowed us to resolve the main issue for
rematching clients dynamically and keeping alive simultaneously other instances in progress.
23Some participants did not fill in the survey which explains that regressions controlling for individual
characteristics will be run on fewer observations.
24We do not cluster at the individual level since the assumption in these type of environments is that
each game can be considered as an individual observation. Note, however, that the significance of the main
results is maintained if we do cluster at the individual level.
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reports the results of a regression where we test the effect of being in a LP treatment on the
probability that Player 1 invests zero. These results indicate that, contrary to the common
wisdom, there is no significant difference in the frequency of zero investment between NP and
LP treatments. This evidence is in line with the motivation behind our theoretical model of
investment. The next step of our analysis is to test the main prediction of our theory.
4.3.2 Testing the central theoretical prediction
The main theoretical prediction is that we should observe investors choosing a level of in-
vestment equal to 1 less often in the NP high-prize treatment than in the NP low-prize
treatment. The theory does not, however, predict whether we should observe a reversal to
the degenerate equilibrium or to a higher level of investment. The experimental evidence is
then useful both to test the theoretical prediction and to shed light on equilibrium selection.
Figure 2 clearly shows that the difference between the low-prize and high-prize treatments
is striking and goes in the direction suggested by the theory. Furthermore, Figure 3 suggests
that learning strengthens this result. In the left panel we report the proportion of ones in
the first game the players played and in the right the proportion in the later games. The
proportion goes up for the low-prize treatments, while it slightly decreases in the high prize
treatments. With learning players move closer to equilibrium behavior, although there is
always a non-negligible fraction that play non-equilibrium strategies.
We test the central prediction controlling for different factors. Table 5 reports the results
of a probit regression of the probability of an investment of one by Player 1. The probability
of observing an investment of one in the NP-low-prize treatment is significantly higher than
in the NP-high-prize treatment. This result holds even when we control for individual
characteristics and risk attitudes. A potential worry is that this result is not driven by
our mechanism but by differences in the investors’ perceptions of the two gambles. However,
when the same comparison is run between the two LP treatments, the effect tends to go in
the other direction: Figure 4 shows that in the case of legal protection of the investment,
an investment of one is more likely in the high-prize treatments.25 Thus, if any behavioral
mechanism not considered by our theoretical framework was playing a role this would tend
to go in the opposite direction with respect to our findings.
It is clear that in the high prize treatment participants play 1 less often, but do they
revert to not investing (the degenerate equilibrium)? In Figure 5, we present the full dis-
tribution of investment choices in the two NP treatments. We see that there is both an
increase in the frequency of zero investment and in the frequency of the maximum invest-
ment level. Importantly, average investment is 13% higher in the NP-high-prize treatment
25A regression analysis confirms that the effect is significant.
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and this difference is significant (p-value of 0.03 in a t-test). Consistently with our theoretical
predictions, taking a mean-preserving spread of the distribution leads on average to more
investment.
4.3.3 Cooperative behavior
The results of the previous section provide strong support for the central prediction of the
theory. However to test further the coherence of our explanation, we examine in the current
section the cooperative behavior of the investors and the other players whenever a prize is
obtained.
We first focus on the cooperative behavior in games where Player 1 chooses one token.
Figure 6 represents the distribution of outcomes in the prisoner’s dilemma keeping in each
game only the first round where a prize is obtained provided it exists (the plot averaging
over all rounds looks very similar). We clearly see that the outcome LL where both players
choose to defect in the stage prisoner dilemma is much more likely in the high-prize treatment
compared to the low-prize treatment as the theory suggested: the temptation to deviate is
much larger.
It is, of course, not easy to interpret the actions chosen in the stage prisoner dilemma
game following an investment that should not occur in equilibrium. In particular, why would
the investor make a positive investment choice if he then expects LL to be the most likely
outcome? It therefore seems more natural to focus exclusively on the behavior of the player
2’s following an investment of 1 by the investor. The results presented in Figure 7 are even
more striking: a player 2 is much more likely to choose L in the high-prize treatment rather
than the low prize treatments.26 The results presented in table 6 confirm the pattern observed
in Figure 7. Even when controlling for individual characteristics, there is a significantly lower
chance that a player 2 plays L following an investment of one in the low-prize treatment.
A final test of coherence with the theory is to examine the cooperative behavior by level
of investment of the investor. The more he invests, the higher the expected continuation
value in equilibrium if HH is played whenever a prize is obtained and thus the higher the
incentives to keep cooperating (Table 3 shows how much the incentives to deviate decrease
as the initial investment increases). We thus plot in Figure 8 the behavior of player 2 in the
NP-high-prize treatments, separately for investments of 1, 6 and 11. There is a clear rise in
the proportions of H’s as the investment moves from 1 to 6, although no significant change
as the investment goes from 6 to 11. Note that this fits with the results in the literature
showing that cooperation rates increase when the discount factor increases (Dal Bo 2005 or
26For Figure 6 and 7 and table 6, we keep in each game only the first round where a prize is obtained
provided it exists.
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Dal Bo and Frechette 2011). However, in our setting the discount rate is implicitly controlled
by Player 1 through his investment decision.
4.3.4 Discussion
Taken together, the results of the experiment provide evidence broadly coherent with our
theoretical model. We show that the investors are less likely to choose the investment level
of one in the high-prize treatments in the absence of legal protection and that if they do,
player 2’s are more likely to defect in (choose action L) in the stage prisoner dilemma game.
Furthermore, the overall results provide evidence that investment does not necessarily fall in
the absence of a legal protection. Indeed, on average investment in the absence of protection
(NP treatments) and with perfect legal protection (LP treatment ) are quite similar. Thus,
the experiment provides evidence that, at least in a controlled environment, a strict legal
protection is not a necessary condition for investment and helps to shed some light on the
basic intuitions underlying our theoretical model.
There are of course other theories that can explain why there might be similar levels of
investment in regimes with and without protection. The most obvious would appear to be a
story of reciprocity (e.g. Berg et al. 1995 and Fehr et al. 1997): when the investor invests a
lot, Player 2 returns the favor by cooperating. It is then rational for Player 1 to invest in the
first place. However it is hard to see how such a theory would lead to a higher investment
level in the NP treatments27 but more importantly it does not seem capable of explaining the
different investment choices between the low-prize and high-prize NP treatments, which are
central to our argument. Finally the significantly lower probability that player 2’s choose not
to cooperate (play L) following an investment of one in the low-prize treatment with respect
to the high-prize treatment while consistent with our theoretical framework seems hard to
reconcile with a reciprocity explanation. Indeed, since both the motivation and the overall
expected stakes are comparable in the two treatments, we would not expect any difference
in the behavior of reciprocal players in this case.
5 Conclusion
Our theory of investment and cooperation in the shadow of future interactions has multiple
possible applications. Nevertheless, our central results can be summarized in the context of
a specific example, that of the firm Red Hat. Red Hat, a hugely successful company, was
created in 1993. At its stock market introduction, Red Hat was one of the biggest IPOs in
27One could always think of a story where the reciprocity occurs only for sufficiently high level of invest-
ments (strictly above 1) and could thus encourage higher investments by the investor
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the NASDAQ and, since 2009, has been part of the S&P500, with over 3000 employees and
revenues of over 500 million dollars. For many, this success is puzzling, since the company’s
business model is based on open source software. Most of Red Hat’s revenues come from
the sale to companies of subscriptions, including their own pre-compiled version of the open
source operating system Linux, called Red Hat Enterprise Linux, and support services.28
Two facts are particularly striking. First, as acknowledged in Red Hat’s annual report:
“anyone can copy, modify and redistribute Red Hat Enterprise Linux (...) however they are
not permitted to refer to these products as Red Hat”. Numerous clones do indeed exist, but
they appear to avoid competing aggressively and do not gain much market share. Second, in
spite of a potentially extremely competitive environment, Red Hat invests a lot in research.
According to a report from the Linux Foundation, Red Hat is the biggest single contributor
to the Linux Kernel (excluding unaffiliated contributors), and pays the salaries of many of
the top contributing individuals.
Our model can explain such behavior. On the equilibrium path, Red Hat’s clones, ra-
tionally choose not to be too aggressive.29 This can be part of an equilibrium only if Red
Hat invests sufficiently in research. It may be the case that Red Hat innovates more than it
would have if it worked under patents, in order to maintain clones’ incentive not to be too
aggressive. Of course such a claim is tricky to establish empirically, in particular because the
sources of rents for Red Hat are multiple.30 In general, inferring a causal relation between
the absence of patents and high investment is challenging, given that we cannot observe
the investment levels under the counter-factual scenario. This is the main justification for
conducting the laboratory experiment that broadly confirms our results and is the first to
examine experimentally the incentives to invest in different legal environments.
We started the paper with the evidence provided by Greif (1993) that trade between
merchants and intermediaries located on the other side of the Mediterranean was rendered
possible by informal institutions. Our model suggests an informal arrangement complemen-
tary to the one developed by Greif, and suggests, moreover, that trade might have been even
more intense because of the absence of legal rules. Merchants needed to keep the promise
of the future high to keep intermediaries cooperative. Interestingly, the model suggests that
28According to Red Hat’s annual report, the revenues from subscriptions in 2010 were $541M out of a
total revenue of $652M .
29The manager of a clone declared in an interview, “We have the utmost respect for Red Hat and everything
they have done for the community over the years. We have absolutely no desire to upset them” (Kerner
2005).
30Note for instance that even though Red Hat does not use patents, it relies on protection of its brand
name: clones can sell copies of Red Hat Linux but cannot call them that way. This is compatible with our
model where the prisoner’s dilemma is such that the innovator can obtain a larger share of profits than the
other players on the equilibrium path.
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the merchants would not send bigger ships (which would leave the incentives to deviate
unchanged) but more robust ones having higher chances of reaching their final destination.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Part a of the proposition is immediate. For Part b, suppose
there exists a value p˜i and an investment k such that conditions (2) and (3) hold and let
Player 1 choose pi = p˜i in Period 0 along with an investment k. Consider an equilibrium path
in which all the players play C forever with a threat of D forever (the worst punishment) if
anyone deviates (including Player 1 initially deviating to a different choice of k). Suppose
that in period t the realization of the payoff variable is pit and recall that pˆit = min {pit, p¯i}.
Starting in period t, following the path yields a player (for i = 1 or o)
αipˆit + αi
δ
1− δ
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
while deviating yields
βipˆit + λi
δ
1− δ
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
All players will follow the path if
(βi − αi) pˆit ≤ (αi − λi) δ
1− δ
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
for i = 1 and o
iff pˆit ≤ δ
1− δR
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
which holds from condition (2), since pˆit ≤ p¯i = p˜i. Player 1’s overall payoff will then be:
−k + δ
1− δα1
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
From condition (3), this expected payoff is larger than the payoff from choosing a different
value of k since the other players play D forever in that case. Therefore conditions (2) and
(3) guarantee that a subgame perfect equilibrium with investment k > kd exists.
Conversely, for given k, let p˜imax = {sup p˜i s.t. 2 holds} (we showed in the main text that
p˜imax exists). Then p˜imax is an upperbound on the single period payoff on which the players
can cooperate. If:
−k + δ
1− δα1
(∫ pimax
0
pidF (pi, k) + pimax (1− F (pimax))
)
< −kd + δ
1− δλ1
∫ ∞
0
pidF (pi, kd)
then Player 1 will prefer to invest kd to k.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that under G there is a symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium in which Player 1 invests k. From Proposition 1 there is a p˜i such that
p˜i ≤ δ
1− δR
(∫ p˜i
0
pidG (pi, k) + p˜i (1−G (p˜i))
)
and
−k + δ
1− δα1
(∫ pi
0
pidG (pi, k) + pi (1−G (pi))
)
≥ −kd + δ
1− δλ1
∫ ∞
0
pidG (pi, kd)
Integrating by parts, we can rewrite these conditions as:
pi ≤ R δ
1− δ
(
pi −
∫ pi
0
G(pi, k)dpi
)
and
−k + δ
1− δα1
(
pi −
∫ pi
0
G(pi, k)dpi
)
≥ −kd + δ
1− δλ1
∫ ∞
0
pidG (pi, kd)
Since G is a mean-preserving spread of F , F second order stochastically dominates G.
From the definition of second order stochastic dominance,(
pi −
∫ pi
0
G(pi, k)dpi
)
≤
(
pi −
∫ pi
0
F (pi, k)dpi
)
.
Hence,
pi ≤ R δ
1− δ
(
pi −
∫ pi
0
F (pi, k)dpi
)
and
−k + δ
1− δα1
(
pi −
∫ pi
0
F (pi, k)dpi
)
≥ −kd + δ
1− δλ1
∫ ∞
0
pidG (pi, kd)
= −kd + δ
1− δλ1
∫ ∞
0
pidF (pi, kd)
Thus, a choice of k is also sustainable under F . Conversely, we give an example in the main
text showing that some investments k 6= kd can be part of an equilibrium under F and not
under G.
Proof of Proposition 3. We can rewrite the conditions of Proposition 1 for an
investment k as:
pi0
m
≤ δ
1− δRmh(k)
pi0
m
⇔ 1
m
≤ δ
1− δRh(k) (4)
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and
−k + δ
1− δα1pi0h(k) ≥ −kd +
δ
1− δλ1pi0h(kd) (5)
Let m be defined by:
1
m
=
δ
1− δRh(k
∗)
For m > m, the cooperation constraint (4) is satisfied. Given that k∗ is part of an
equilibrium for m=1, the investment constraint (5) is also satisfied. So, as stated in the
Proposition 1, k∗ is a subgame perfect equilibrium and so are some values k larger and
smaller than k∗.
For m < m, the cooperation constraint (4) evaluated at k∗ is violated, so that following
an investment of k ≤ k∗ the players play non-cooperatively and the only possible equilibrium
with k ≤ k∗ is the degenerate equilibrium, where Player 1 chooses k = kd.
There is however a range of values such that some investments strictly above k∗ are part
of an equilibrium. Define m as:
1
m
=
δ
1− δRh(k)
where k is such that:
−k + δ
1− δα1pi0h(k) = −kd +
δ
1− δλ1pi0h(kd)
Given this definition, for m ≥ m, an investment of k > k∗ is part of a subgame perfect
equilibrium. This establishes the second result of the Proposition.
Finally, for m < m, the only non-degenerate equilibria would involve investments above
k. We show below that this would lead to negative profits and cannot therefore be an
equilibrium. Thus, for this region, the only subgame perfect equilibrium is the degenerate
equilibrium.
Define:
G(k) = −k + δ
1− δα1pi0h(k)−
(
−kd + δ
1− δλ1pi0h(kd)
)
We know G(k∗) > 0, G(k) = 0, and because G
′′
< 0, this implies that G
′
< 0 for k > k.
Thus G(k) < 0 for k > k
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof follows the same lines as the proof of Proposition
3. Given the distribution function at hand, the condition for cooperation can be rewritten
as p˜i ≤ δ
1−δRp(k
∗)p˜i. Let R be defined by 1 = δ
1−δRp(k
∗). Since k∗ forms part of a strict
equilibrium, mini
[
α¯i−λ¯i
β¯i−α¯i
]
> R¯ and −k∗ + δ
1−δ α¯1p(k
∗)p˜i > −kd + δ1−δ λ¯1p(kd)p˜i. By continuity,
there are parameters αi, βi, γi, and λi for which R > R and Player 1 invests more than k
∗
28
and parameters for which he invests less. In these equilibria, the other players threaten to
play non-cooperatively if Player 1 does not make the “appropriate” investment.
If R < R, investing k∗ can no longer be part of an equilibrium since the players will play
non-cooperatively following an investment k∗. To induce the players to play cooperatively,a
higher level of investment needs to be made. Again, by continuity there are parameter values
for which R < R and a higher investment forms part of an equilibrium.
Finally, let G(k) = −k + δ
1−δp(k)p˜i. Notice that, G (0) = 0 and G (k
∗) > 0. Since G′′ < 0
and G
(
δ
1−δ p˜i
)
< 0, there exists a kˆ > k∗ such that G(kˆ) = 0 and G (k) < 0 for all k > kˆ.
Define R by 1 = δ
1−δRp(kˆ). For R < R, cooperation is possible only if k > kˆ. But Player 1
cannot recoup such an investment since, for all k > kˆ and α1, −k+α1 δ1−δp(k)p˜i < G (k) < 0.
Thus, in this region, the only subgame perfect equilibrium involves an investment k = kd.
Proof of Proposition 5. Since k∗ is a strict equilibrium forH = 0, −k∗+ δ
1−δ α¯1p (k
∗) p˜i >
−kd+ δ1−δ λ¯1p(kd)p˜i. Let Hˆ be defined by Hˆ = −k∗+ δ1−δλ1p (k∗) pi. For 0 ≤ H ≤ Hˆ, an invest-
ment of the fixed cost H plus the variable cost k∗ remains part of an equilibrium. For H > Hˆ,
a variable investment of k∗ is not part of an equilibrium, since −k∗−H + δ
1−δλ1p (k
∗) pi < 0.
Moreover, neither is any variable investment k > k∗ since d
dk
(−k∗ −H + δ
1−δλ1p (k
∗) pi
)
=
−1 + δ
1−δλ1p
′ (k∗) pi < −1 + δ
1−δp
′ (k∗) pi = 0 and d
2
dk2
(−k −H + δ
1−δλ1p (k)pi
)
< 0. Since k∗
is a strict equilibrium, 1 < δ
1−δRmh(k
′). Let k′ < k∗ be defined by 1 = δ
1−δRmh(k
′) and H ′
be defined by −k′−H ′ + δ
1−δλ1p (k
′) pi = 0. For all H ∈
(
Hˆ,H ′
)
, an investment of k′ forms
part of an equilibrium.
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Table 1: Investment options in high vs low prize treatments
Low-prize treatments High-prize treatments
Investment Prize Probability Prize Probability
0 8 0 16 0
1 8 0.3 16 0.15
6 8 0.4 16 0.2
11 8 0.5 16 0.25
Table 2: Stage prisoner’s dilemma experimental game
H L
H Π/2,Π/2 0,Π
L Π, 0 0, 0
Note: Π = 8 for the low-prize treatments and Π = 16 for the high-prize treatments
Table 3: Profits and deviation incentives in NP treatments
Low-prize treatments High-prize treatments
Investment Expected Deviation Expected Deviation
profits of incentive profits of incentives
player 1 player 1
1 10.8 -2.8 14.8 1.2
6 13.1 -5.1 17.1 -1.1
11 15.3 -7.3 19.3 -3.3
NOTE: Expected profits of player 1 calculated under the assumption that (H,H) is played whenever
a prize is obtained. Deviation incentives is the difference between the prize (i.e deviation profits) and the
expected profits if (H,H) is played whenever a prize is obtained (i.e expected profits on equilibrium path). A
positive value for the deviation incentives means that level of investment cannot be part of an equilibrium.
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Table 4: Probability of observing no investment by player 1
(1) (2) (3)
LP treatment .57 .52 .16
(.50) (.40) (.60)
Individual controls (except risk) no yes yes
All controls no no yes
Number of observations 1756 1702 1692
NOTE: Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1 percent
level, **Significant at the 5 percent level , *Significant at the 10 percent level
Table 5: Probability of observing investment of 1 by player 1
(1) (2) (3)
Low prize treatment .37∗∗ .29∗∗ .37∗
(.15) (.13) (.21)
Individual controls (except risk) no yes yes
All controls no no yes
Number of observations 947 893 893
NOTE: Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses . ***Significant at the 1 percent
level, **Significant at the 5 percent level , *Significant at the 10 percent level
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Table 6: Probability of player 2 playing L in games where player 1 invested 1
(1) (2) (3)
Low prize treatment -.44 -.36 -.71∗∗
(.38) (.31) (.36)
Individual controls (except risk) no yes yes
All controls no no yes
Clustered standard errors no no no
Number of observations 183 171 167
NOTE: We keep only observations corresponding to the first time a prize is obtained in the game
(provided it exists). Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1
percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level , *Significant at the 10 percent level
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